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Abstract-; Federal Supplemental Compensation {FSC) was the program
that temporarily extended the duration of Unemployment Insurance
(UI) benefits by 8 to 14 weeks during 1982-1984. This paper
examines whether and to what degree the extension of benefits
under FSC increased the expected length of UI recipients' jobless
spells. The estimates are derived from a large Ul-administrative
data base that spans the expiration of FSC and allows one to
observe whether and (approximately) when a worker actually
returned to work. Previous studies of the effects of extended
benefits have had to make assumptions about UI recipients' return
to work that appear to yield downward-biased estimates of the
effect of extended benefits on expected jobless duration. The
estimates presented here suggest that an .additional week of
benefit eligibility increases a UI recipient's expected spell of
joblessness by nearly one week. Moreover, the estimates suggest
that claimants who exhausted their regular UI benefits and were
ineligible for an additional 12 weeks of FSC were more than six
times as likely to return to work as claimants who exhausted their
regular benefits but were eligible for FSC. Hence, the findings
offer striking evidence that workers tend to find jobs just as
their UI benefits expire.

Potential Duration of Unemployment Benefits and
the Duration of Joblessness
Stephen A. Woodbury

Since the mid-1970s, the most-researched question about the
Unemployment Insurance <UI) system has been whether and to what
degree higher weekly Ul-benefit amounts lengthen UI recipients'
jobless spells.

But an equally important and under-researched

question is how the potential duration of those benefits
influences the length of jobless spells.
important for two reasons.

The latter question is

First, since the 1950s, a variety of

extended Ul-benefit programs have been legislated at the federal
level, making the potential duration of UI benefits a highly
variable aspect of the UI system.

Second, as will become clear,

econometric problems make far more tenuous any inference about the
influence of Ul-benefit extensions on the expected length of UI
recipients' jobless spells.
This paper explores the effects of the most recent Ul-benefit
extension program, the Federal Supplemental Compensation (FSC)
program, which temporarily extended the duration of Unemployment
Insurance <UI) benefits by 8 to 14 weeks during 1982-1984.
Estimates of how FSC influenced the length of UI recipients'
expected jobless spells are derived from a large UI administrative
data base that was gathered just before and just after the
expiration of FSC in late 1984.

These data offer two advantages

over the administrative data used in most existing studies of the
effects of potential benefit duration on expected jobless

duration.

First, because the data were gathered just before and

after the expiration of the FSC program, eligibility for FSC
depends (for most of the sample) only on the timing of a worker's
initial claim for UI benefits, and is independent of each worker's
characteristics and earnings history.

Second, the data allow one

to observe whether and (approximately) when a worker actually
returned to work.

The ability to observe actual return-to-work

allows one to overcome what appears to be the most important
econometric problem involved in appraising the effects of extended
benefits on expected jobless duration that of correctly
specifying whether an observed spell of joblessness is complete or
censored.
The next section offers some background both historical and
economic on extended benefits.

Section II characterizes the

problems of measurement that appear to have hampered researchers
in their efforts to obtain unbiased estimates of the influence of
potential benefit duration on the expected length of UI
recipients' jobless spells.

That section also treats the data

used in this study and describes how they can yield improved
estimates of the effects of extended benefits.

Section III

develops and presents estimates of several models that allow one
to infer the effects of extended benefits.

Included are a simple

linear duration model, a parametric jobless duration model that
accounts for censoring of the dependent variable and non-normality
of the error term, and a semi-parametric model of the conditional
probability (or hazard) of returning to work.
summarizes the findings of the paper.

A final section

I.

A.

Potential UI Benefit Duration and Extended Benefits

Institutional and Policy Background

At the outset of the U.S. Unemployment Insurance program in
1936, the decision was made to limit benefit duration, mainly on
!

the grounds that benefits that could not be financed out of
anticipated contributions should not be provided (Haber and Murray
1966, pp. 111-113).

That decision, which today is so widely

accepted that it is taken for granted, has led to a variety of
policy questions and economic issues.

For example, on what

grounds is benefit duration to be limited, and what should the
limit be?

Should potential duration of regular benefits be

uniform for all workers, or vary with a worker's employment
history?

Should extended benefits be made available to workers

who exhaust their regular benefits during economic downturns?

If

so, how should the duration of the extended benefits be set?
Should extended benefits be discretionary that is, made available
when Congress and the Administration see a need or triggered
automatically by prespecified macroeconomic conditions?

If an

automatic trigger is chosen, how should the prespecified
conditions be set?
Today, limited l-£BEFfce~a benefit duration is accepted as a
premise of the UI system both for financial reasons <as in 1936)
and because it is widely believed that to make available benefits
of unlimited duration would weaken incentives to seek employment.

This latter point that longer potential benefit duration leads to
longer spells of joblessness is now the central policy issue in
regard to the duration of benefits for the obvious reason that
answers to the six questions posed above depend on it.

Even though limited benefit duration is accepted as a premise
of the UI system, it has become clear in the last 20 years that
the UI system is expected to respond to severe cyclical downturns
by extending benefits for workers who have exhausted their regular
benefits.

Indeed, Murray (1974) has stated this as a premise of

the UI system, and bot/h Might (1975) and Corson and Nicholson
(1982) have shown how extending benefits during a recession can
alleviate hardship and reduce exhaustion rates to levels as low as
would occur under good economic conditions.
The initial rationale for extended benefits was that as labor
market conditions worsen during a recession, jobless spells
lengthen as it becomes more difficult to find a job.

This basic

rationale was undermined during the 1970s by research showing that
most jobless spells are of short duration, even those spells
experienced during a recession (Perry 1972; Hall 1972).

Indeed,

recent evidence reported by Dynarski and Sheffrin (1987) suggests
that the average duration of a jobless spell varies little over
the business cycle.

Such findings call into question the

soundness of extending benefits during cyclical downturns.
Three types of findings have mitigated the effects of the
arguments against extending benefits during downturns.

First,

various studies of workers who have exhausted their UI benefits
(Mathematical Policy Research 1976; see Murray 1974 and Hamerraesh

1977 for reviews of the earlier exhaustee studies) suggest that
exhaustees are strongly attached to the labor force, and are not
workers who would have dropped out of the labor force had they
been ineligible for benefits.

Second, the turnover view of the

labor market that most jobless spells are short seems to have
neglected the existence of a relatively small group of workers who
experience very long unemployment spells (Akerlof and Main 1980;
Clark and Summers 1979).

Third, and most important, the most

recent studies of workers' responses to extended benefits suggest
that extending the potential duration of UI benefits does not
appreciably increase the expected duration of jobless spells (see
in particular Moffitt 1985a, 1985b).

If these latter findings are

accepted, then there can be little objection to extending UI
benefits during cyclical downturns.

B.

Theoretical Issues

Most estimates of the effects of both benefit duration and
benefit amounts on the duration of joblessness have been based on
one or another model of job search (see Mortensen 1986).

These

models provide a theoretical link between the duration of
joblessness, on the one hand, and job-search intensity, individual
characteristics, and labor market conditions, on the other.

It is

useful to review a general job-search model as a prelude to the
i
empirical work.
1. Other models also provide possible bases for empirical work
on unemployment duration. Moffitt and Nicholson (1982) have used
the familiar Income-leisure model of labor supply, and Davidson

Let- T denote the week in which a UI recipient returns to
work, and let P^ denote the probability that a UI recipient
returns to work in week t, given that she has not already returned
to work by then; that is, P. = Pr[T=t I T2.t] .

Then we can express

P. as the product of (a) the probability of receiving a job offer
in week t and (b) the probability of accepting that job offer,
given that an offer has been made.

The probability of receiving

depends on the intensity of the
an job offer in week t (J,)
V

worker's job search (i) and a vector of characteristics of the
worker that determine the demand for the worker's labor (c); that
is, J,\f = J.W (i,c).

The probability of offer acceptance (A.V )

depends on whether "the offered wage <w )

equals or exceeds the

worker's reservation wage (wr ); t-hat is, A, = Pr[w >_wr |J, ].
Hence, we can express ^/he probability of finding reemployment

during week t <given that reemployment has not already occurred)
as:
U>

Pt = Jt <i,c) At .
We have defined P.

in discrete time above.

In the limit, as

the time interval over which reemployment is measured approaches
zero, P,\/ becomes an instantaneous rate of reemployment known as a
hazard rate, h(t). The hazard rate is linked to unemployment
duration in the following way.

If t has cumulative distribution

F(t), and frequency distribution f(t), then h<t) = f(t)/[l - F(t)]
= f(t)/S(t), where S(t) is the so-called survivor function, or the
probability of being unemployed to time t (Lancaster 1979).

We

can also express the survivor function as dependent on the hazard:
and Woodbury <1989) have used a job-matching model.

S(t) = f(t)/h(t).

Thus, the hazard rate is inversely related to

the survival probability, and any factor that increases the hazard
rate should decrease expected unemployment duration.

For example,

equation <1) highlights the fact that longer spells of joblessness
can result from less-intense job search, from individual
characteristics (c) that imply lower demand for a worker's
services, or from a lower probability of job-offer acceptance.
From the point of view of the present work, the probability of
offer acceptance, A^ r and the intensity of job search, i, are
central, depending as they do on the generosity and duration of UI
benefits.

II.

Problems of Data and Inference

The data used here come from the administrative records of
the State of Illinois Unemployment Insurance system, and were
gathered as part of the Illinois UI Bonus experiment (see Woodbury
and Spiegelman 1987, pp. 514-518, for a fuller description).

The

workers examined here are the 2,162 Ul-eligible male claimants who
were assigned to the control group of the experiment.
The Illinois data are typical of the data used in past
studies of the effects of extended benefits on the duration of
unemployment because they are administrative data that is, data
gathered and maintained by agencies responsible for administering
the UI program.

Indeed, it would make little sense to use any

other type of data to address this issue, because only in
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administrative data is there accurate information on a claimant's
eligibility for UI and extended benefits.

But the Illinois data have three features that make them
unique among UI administrative data, and especially well suited to
an examination of the influence of potential benefit duration on
expected jobless duration.

First, they span the expiration of the

FSC program at the end of 1984.

Consequently, they permit one to

compare the jobless spells of workers who were actually eligible
to FSC with the spells of workers who would have been eligible if
they had become unemployed and .filed for benefits only weeks
earlier.

In other available data sets, eligibility for extended

benefits often depends on an individual's work history (base
period earnings or weeks of employment prior to layoff).
Inferences about the independent contribution of potential benefit
duration to the length of a jobless spell should be less tenuous
with the Illinois data than in data where potential duration is
correlated with work history.
Second, the Illinois data include both earnings history data
and a return to work indicator, which permit one to make an
accurate classification of jobless spells as complete or
censored.

2

Earlier researchers have frequently had to make what

appear to be erroneous assumptions about whether a spell of
insured unemployment represents a complete or censored spell of

2.
Because these are administrative data, there is no way of
distinguishing unemployment from out-of-labor-force status for
workers who have no earnings after the spell of insured
unemployment ends. Accordingly, we focus on the duration of
joblessness (meaning either unemployment or out-of-labor force
status), and with the probability of return to work.

joblessness.

A more complete discussion of this issue and its

consequences follows.

A.

Censoring Problems

Most analyses of the effects on jobless duration of potential
benefit duration and benefit amounts have used basic benefits data
t
from UI administrative files. These data are extremely rich: For
example, in the Illinois data, the so-called Benefits Information
System contains demographic data on claimants, the dates of their
UI claims, and the amount and timing of benefits received.
But basic benefits data from UI administrative files are
usually deficient in that they exclude any information on the
subsequent earnings of claimants.

Hence, they fail to offer data

on actual spells of unemployment.

Rather, they indicate only the

duration of insured unemployment experienced by a claimant.
In the Illinois data, this deficiency can be partly overcome
by two additional pieces of data.

The first is a return-to-work

indicator that was constructed with the cooperation of Illinois
Department of Employment Security personnel during and after the
experiment that generated the data.

The second is a separate

administrative data base known as Wage Records, which stores
information on the earnings history of workers both before and
after their spell of insured unemployment.

By matching each

claimant's wage record to his or her benefits data, it is possible
to determine whether a spell of insured unemployment was followed
by a period of earnings.

If the observed spell of insured
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unemployment was followed by a period of earnings, and if the
return-to-work indicator was positive, then we can infer that the
insured spell and the actual spell of joblessness were the same.
On the other hand, if the insured spell was not followed by a
spell of earnings, the insured spell must be considered a censored
or truncated measure of the actual spell of joblessness.
It is rare for administrative data to have a return-to-work
indicator or Wage Records matched to the benefits data, as in the
Illinois data.

As a result, existing research using

administrative data has necessasrily taken a different approach to
drawing inferences about actual spells of joblessness from
observations on insured unemployment spells.

First, because the

number of weeks of unemployment that can be observed in
administrative data is limited by the potential duration of UI
benefits, it has been assumed that any spell of insured
unemployment that is at the maximum potential is an incomplete
spell.

For example, a worker eligible for 26 weeks of state

regular benefits who is observed receiving 26 weeks of UI benefits
would be considered to have had a jobless spell of greater than 26
weeks.

Second, and conversely, a workers eligible for 26 weeks of

benefits who is observed receiving less than 26 weeks of UI
benefits would be considered to have had a jobless spell of
exactly the observed length.
Neither of these assumptions is necessarily correct, as can
be seen in Table 1, which shows four cases, labeled A through D.
Cases A and B are those of workers who received the maximum
potential weeks of UI benefits that is, exhausted their benefits.
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It is possible for such workers to return to work immediately
after receiving their last benefit payment (Case A), or to
continue to be out of covered employment (Case B, which implies
either continuing to seek employment or dropping out of the labor
force after receiving the last benefit payment). 3

ip^ e usua i

assumption is that all workers who exhaust benefits continue
without covered employment, as in Case B.

But the right-most

column of Table 1 shows that this assumption is incorrect for
nearly 40 percent of the men in the control group of the Illinois
UI experiment who exhausted their benefits.
show

That/ is, the data

bhat 283 of the 717 men who exhausted their benefits returned

t/o work immediately (or very shortly) after receiving their last
benefit payment.
Likewise, it is possible to misclassify a worker who did not
exhaust his or her benefits.

Cases C and D in Table 1 are those

of workers who received fewer than the potential weeks of benefit
payments.

Again, the usual assumption is that all such workers

returned to work immediately after they stopped receiving
benefits, as in Case C.

But the right most column shows that 405

{or 28 percent) of the 1,445 men who ended their benefits before
exhausting did not return to covered employment.

4

3. Obtaining uncovered (usually underground) employment and
moving out of state are additional possibilities.
4. Most likely, these men either dropped out of the labor force
or took uncovered employment, although it is possible that they
stopped participating in UI and continued to seek employment.
There is no way of distinguishing these possibilities in the
administrative data.
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B.

Censoring and Inference

Estimating the effects of extended UI benefits on expected
unemployment duration offers a fine example of how censored data
can interfere with statistical inference.

Because the Federal

Supplemental Compensation program expired about half-way into the
enrollment period of the Illinois experiment, men in the control
group of the Illinois experiment can be divided into four
categories!

(a) those who were eligible for FSC because they met

the monetary eligibility criteria for FSC

and filed their

initial UI claim while FSC was still in effect; <b) those who were
monetarily eligible for FSC, but claimed benefits too late to
actually receive FSC;

(c) those who were monetarily ineligible for

benefits, but filed their initial claim before FSC expired; and
<d) those who were monetarily ineligible for benefits, and filed
their initial claim after FSC expired.
Table 2 shows the mean insured unemployment duration for each
of these four groups.

What we appear to have is a situation in

which the expiration of FSC gives us a natural experiment.

The

mean unemployment duration of workers eligible for FSC (21.4
weeks) can be compared with the mean unemployment duration of
workers monetarily eligible but temporally ineligible because they
filed after FSC expired (17.3 weeks).

As a quasi-control, the

mean unemployment duration of workers who were monetarily

5. The
stringent
claimants
were also

monetary eligibility criteria for FSC were somewhat more
than for state regular benefits. That is, not all UI
who were monetarily eligible for state regular benefits
monetarily eligible for FSC.
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rneligible but who filed for benefits while FSC was still in
effect (1G.5 weeks) can be compared with the mean unemployment
duration of workers who were neither monetarily nor temporally
eligible (20.1 weeks).
The two comparisons are shown in the bottom row of Table 2
(labeled "Difference").

The difference between the two groups of

monetarily eligible workers, 3.5 weeks, suggests that FSC
j
prolonged unemployment spells significantly. Moreover, the
difference between the two groups of monetarily ineligible
workers, -3.5 (with a large standard error), suggests that there
was no underlying macroeconomic or other reason for expecting
unemployment spells to be longer after the expiration of FSC.

The

conclusion would seem to be that workers eligible for FSC tended
to take over three weeks longer to return to work than did workers
who were not eligible for FSC.
Such an inference would clearly be wrong, though, because it
is impossible to observe more than 26 weeks of unemployment among
workers ineligible for FSC, whereas we can observe up to 38 weeks
of unemployment among workers eligible for FSC.

The truncation or

censoring of unemployment spells at the maximum potential duration
leads to a situation in which the two group means cannot be
compared.

To take Moffitt's (1985a) extreme example, every worker

in each of the two groups might have an actual spell of
joblessness of 30 weeks, but we would observe an average of 26
weeks for the first group (because the data are censored at 26
weeks) and 30 weeks for the second (because censoring occurs only
at 38 weeks).

It may still be, of course, that FSC tended to
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lengthen jobless spells, but the data in Table 2 cannot be used to
make such an inference.

In the presence of censoring, quasi-experimental comparisons
like those presented in Table 2 fail to yield reliable estimates
of the effects of extended benefits on jobless duration.
other methods of inference must be sought.

Hence,

It is convenient that

a variety of methods have been developed for handling censored
i

duration data methods that allow one to make inferences about
actual spells of joblessness from spells of insured unemployment
(see the recent review by Kiefer 1988).

Some of these methods are

applied in parts B and C of the next section.

III.

Models of Unemployment Duration and Reemployment Hazard

Estimates of how potential benefit duration affects the
expected duration of joblessness have progressed through three
stages.

In this section, the approach represented by each of

these stages is outlined, and estimated results of models based on
each approach are presented.

A.

A Linear Model of Insured Unemployment Duration

The earliest empirical work on the effects of potential
duration on expected jobless duration took the straightforward
approach of regressing the duration in weeks of insured
unemployment (D) on appropriate explanatory variables (x-

x ^), including measures of the replacement, ratio and potential
duration of benefits:
(2)

D = a Q + a 1 x 1 + ... + ^ K x K + u f

where u is assumed to be a normally distributed disturbance term.
The coefficients of x. through x^ provide an estimate of the
relationship between the explanatory variables on weeks of insured

unemployment.

Studies that took this approach include Ehrenberg

and Oaxaca (1976), and Holen (1976), among others.
Column (2) of Table 3 displays the results of such a model
applied to the Illinois control-group men.

The results are in

keeping with the simple comparison of means shown in Table 2, in
that the coefficient of the FSC eligibility variable suggests that
the availability of FSC increased the expected length of jobless
spells by over three weeks.
Note that a variety of control variables, which are of
secondary importance for present purposes, have also been
included in the model:

age, ethnicity, the number of employers

that the claimant worked for in the base period, base period
earnings, the number of referrals received by the claimant from
the Job Service, whether a dependents' allowance was received, the
weekly UI benefit amount, and the conditions of the labor market
in which the claimant was searching for work.
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B.

Parametric Models of Time to Reemployment

It is now well-known, however, that the assumption that u in
equation (2) is normal is untenable, and that application of
Ordinary Least Squares <OLS) to equation <2) will produce biased
coefficient estimates.

There are two reasons for this.

First, as

already discussed, D is a censored measure of actual jobless
duration, since each worker is eligible for a specified maximum
number of weeks of benefits.

As a result, the distribution of D

is truncated at the maximum benefit duration.

Realization of this

problem lead to some studies that assumed that the underlying
distribution of jobless spells is normal, and as a result assumed
that the distribution of u in equation (2) is truncated normal.
For example, Newton and Rosen {1979) and Classen (1979) both used
Tobit analysis which assumes that u has the truncated normal
distribution to correct for the truncation of the dependent
variable.

Newton and Rosen's results suggest that an additional

week of potential benefit duration leads to 0.4 to 0.5 additional
weeks of insured unemployment, whereas Classen's estimates suggest
at most an additional 0.1 weeks.
The second reason for questioning the assumption that u in
equation <2) is normal is that the empirical frequency
distribution of weeks of insured unemployment in most data is not
bell-shaped, as the normality assumption requires.

Rather, it

shows one spike at zero weeks of unemployment, and falling
frequencies for greater unemployment durations, until a spike
appears where censoring occurs (that is, at maximum benefit
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duration.)

Except for the spike at the censoring point, the

empirical distribution looks much like an inverse exponential.
This latter problem can be solved in a jobless-duration equation
like (2) by making a more appropriate assumption about the
distribution of u, and estimating equation (2) under that
alternative distributional assumption.

The Weibull distribution

has been widely assumed in studies of jobless duration because it
provides an approximation to the empirical distribution of jobless
duration that appears to be valid (Lancaster 1979).

(The

exponential distribution is a special case of the Weibull.
Whereas the exponential restricts -the conditional probability that
a UI recipient will become reemployed (P.

or the hazard rate) to

be constant over -the spell of unemployment, the Weibull allows for
the possibility that a UI recipient's probability of reemployment
rises or falls over the spell.

The greater generality of the

Weibull distribution makes it "the preferred choice. )
Several studies have imposed a more appropriate
distributional assumption on u in equation (2), although few of
these have examined the effects of potential benefit duration on
the length of unemployment spells.

Among the few that do, Solon

(1985) has estimated that an additional week of potential benefit
duration leads to 0.3 additional weeks of insured unemployment.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 display the results of
estimating equation (2) under the assumption that the disturbance
term u has the Weibull distribution.

The interpretation of the

Weibull model's coefficients is straightforward:

Each coefficient

gives the approximate proportional change in unemployment duration
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that is attributable to a unit change in the explanatory
variable.

The two Weibull models differ in the way that censored
observations are defined.

In the model displayed in column <3),

the usual censoring assumptions are made all observations that
are at the maximum potential benefit duration are defined as
censored, and all other observations are taken to reflect actual
weeks of joblessness.

As discussed in section II.B, this is a

misspecification of censoring, and column (3) is labeled
accordingly.

In the model displayed in column <4), I took

advantage of the additional information on subsequent employment
available in the Illinois data.

This additional information

allowed me to correct the misclassification of some completed
spells of unemployment as censored (and vice versa), and column
(4) is accordingly labeled "Corrected Censoring."
The main difference between the estimates resulting from the
two Weibull models is in the estimated effect of FSC on the
expected duration of joblessness.

This should not be surprising,

because the effect of FSC might well be concentrated on workers
who have long spells of joblessness.

These are precisely the

workers about whom we are making crucial assumptions regarding
whether a spell of joblessness is complete or censored.

From the

model of column (3), we can infer that the availability of FSC
tends to reduce the expected duration of joblessness.

This

6.
The exact proportional change in duration attributable to a
unit change in an explanatory variable is [exp(b ) - i]/shape,
where shape is the Weibull shape parameter.
If b, is small, and
if the shape parameter is close to unity, then this expression
approximately equals b, .
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inference should not be taken seriously because there is good
reason to believe that in this model, some completed spells have
been treated as censored and vice versa.
Censoring has been more accurately specified in the Weibull
model of column (4), and greater credence can probably be given "bo

the finding that FSC tends to increase the expected duration of
joblessness by nearly 5 weeks. 7 This positive relationship
!

between FSC and jobless duration is also more plausible
theoretically, and in keeping with earlier findings.
Hence, the evidence to this point suggest that accounting for
censoring of the dependent variable and non-normality of the error
term yields estimates of the effects of FSC that exceed estimates
derived from simpler techniques that ignore these problems.

Also,

the evidence suggests that the approach to censoring taken in
earlier research tends to yield lower estimates of the effects of
extended benefits than does the corrected method permitted by the
Illinois data.

C.

Semi-Parametric Hazard Models

Two problems cannot be handled in either of the duration
models discussed to this point.

The first is that some variables

may change during a worker's spell of joblessness.

For example,

7.
The proportional effect of FSC is found by exponentiating
the coefficient of FSC (0.18), subtracting 1, and dividing by the
Weibull shape parameter (0.813).
This yields a 24 percent
increase in duration attributable to FSC. Multiplying 0.24 by the
sample mean weeks of observed unemployment (19.75) yields a 4.8
week increase in duration attributable to FSC.
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the number of weeks since the initial claim for UI benefits can be
thought of as a variable that increases weekly.

There is no way

of understanding the effects of such "time-varying" explanatory
variables in a duration model.

The second is that the duration models force us to make an
assumption about the distribution of the error term u in equation
<2), and incorrect distributional assumptions will yield
t
misleading inferences about the effects of FSC. For example, the
Weibull seems a good approximation to the empirical distribution
of jobless spells as long as it is true that the spike in the
empirical distribution in the week following benefit exhaustion
results from censored data.

But if the distribution of jobless

spells shows a true spike in the week following benefit
exhaustion that is, if workers tend to put off finding taking a
job until just after their benfits terminate then the Weibull is
a poor choice.

Ideally, one would like to impose no

distributional assumption at all.
To analyze the effects of time-varying explanatory variables
and to avoid any assumptions about the distribution of jobless
spells requires reconceptualizing the duration problem as a
problem of rate of escape from joblessness.

In other words,

rather than regress some measure of duration on various
explanatory variables, one could regress a dummy variable <R.t/ )
equal to one if a worker escaped from unemployment in week t (zero
otherwise) on various explanatory variables, some of which are
time-invariant <x^ f
<z 1 (t),

., z w (t>).

. .., X LT)/ and others which are time-varying
Since the dependent variable is a measure of
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a worker's probability of escaping joblessness in week t (given
that the worker was "at risk" of escaping joblessness at the
beginning of the week), it is appropriate to interpret the
dependent variable as a hazard rate (as discussed above), and to
call it h(t).
<3)

Hence, this model can be written:

Rt = h<t) = b 0 + b^ -I- ... -f bK x K +
c 1 z 1 <t) + ... + cN z N (,t) + e.
i

If e is assumed normally distributed, then we have a linear
probability model, which is used in the exploratory work reported
p
presently.
Each coefficient in equation (3) represents the change in the
probability of reemployment -that results from a unit change in the
independent variable.

For example, if x. were age in years, then

b* would show the change in probability of reemployment associated
with an additional year of age.

This change in probability would

be assumed constant over the spell of unemployment (unless age
were interacted with a time-varying explanatory variable).

Note

that a positive coefficient indicates a higher probability of
returning to employment, and hence a shorter duration of
unemployment.
Whereas the unit of observation in the various duration
models represented by equation (2) and displayed in Table 3 is the

8. If e is assumed to have the logistic distribution, then we
have a logit model, which is prefered to a linear probability
model because it yields unbiased, consistent, and efficient
coefficient estimates. Exploratory work estimating equation (3)
by logit has yielded results that are nearly identical in terms
of both statistical significance and quantitative response to
variation in explanatory variables to the linear probability
estimates reported below.
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claimant/ "the unit> of observation in a hazard model is the
claimant-week.

The transformation of claimant records into

claimant-week records is illustrated in Table 4.

Panel A shows

records for three claimants, who experienced 4, 38, and 0 weeks of
insured unemployment.

The first and third claimant became

reemployed after receiving their last UI benefit payment, whereas
the second remained jobless.

Also, the first and third were

ineligible for FCS, whereas the second was eligible.
The second panel of Table 4 shows the claimant-week records
that are generated by the three claimant records in Panel A.

The

first claimant contributes a total of 6 observations to the
claimant-week data set one for the waiting week, one for each
week in which UI benefits were received, and one more for the week
following the spell of insured unemployment, since this worker
became reemployed.

The dependent variable in the hazard analysis,

reemployment, is zero in all weeks except the last, in which
reemployment occured.

The second claimant contributes 39

observations to the claimant week data set one for the waiting
week, and one for each week in which UI benefits were received.
The reemployment variable is zero for all of these observations,
and since this claimant did not find reemployment after exhausting
his UI benefits, there is no fortieth observation following the
spell of insured unemployment in which the reemployment variable
equals one.

Note that, when claimant records are transformed into

claimant-week records, each claimant contributes exactly as much
information as is known about him to the analysis of reemployment
probability (Allison 1982).

Hazard models such as <3) start from the pioneering work of
Cox (1972), and are often referred to as "semiparametric" because
they implicitly make no assumption about the distribution of u in
the duration equation (2).

Several recent studies (for example,

Moffitt 1985a, 1985b; Steinberg and Monforte 1987; Sheffrin and
Dynarski 1987; Ham and Rea 1987) have estimated hazard models such

as (3).

Not all such studies have estimated the effects of
i
increases in potential benefit duration on jobless duration:

Moffitt's estimates suggest that a one-week addition to potential
duration leads to a 0.15-week increase in joblessness.
The estimates displayed in Table 5 are from two possible
specifications of equation <3).

Specifically, we regress R. On

the same time-invariant individual characteristics as in the
duration models, and add a set of dummy variables modeling the
time since the initial claim (t., t«, ..., ^N )s
<4)

Rt = h<t) = b Q + b 1 x 1 -I- ... + bKx K +
c l*l * C 2 t> 2 +

" + 0N*N + U<

The time-since-initial-claim dummy variables (t., ..., t ) can be
thought of time-varying explanatory variables, since their values
change as a claimant's time since filing for benefits lengthens.
Note that the use of dummy variables allows estimation of a
completely flexible relationship between the hazard rate and the
time since filing the initial claim.

No assumption is imposed on

the shape of the hazard function.
A negative coefficient in the reemployraent hazard model
implies a lower probability of reemployment in any given week, and
hence a longer expected unemployment duration.

Thus, we expect
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variables with positive coefficients in the duration models to
have negative coefficients in the Reemployment Hazard model.

A

comparison of the results in Table 5 with columns (3) and (4) in
Table 3 shows that this is usually the case.
It is convenient to show graphically how the conditional
probability of reemployment changes with the time since filing the
initial claim, as in Figure 1.

The reemployment hazards under
i

misspecified censoring are shown as squares, whereas the hazards
under corrected censoring are shown as plus signs. g

Both hazard

plots are surprisingly flat, and the differences between the two
are not great except near the expiration points, which are 27 and
39 weeks after filing for benefits.

That the hazards should

differ at these points is important, however, because at these
points erroneous assumptions are made under usual censoring
conventions.
The results of main interest in Table 5 pertain to the
effects of FSC.

When censoring is misspecified as in column (1)

it appears that the availability of FSC has no impact on the
probability if returning to work.

But under corrected censoring

in column <2) the estimated impact of FSC availability on the
probability of returning to work is large.

The coefficient <-

0.012) implies that jobless workers who were eligible to receive
FSC were 1.2 percentage points less likely to return to work in
any given week than were ineligible workers.

9. The reemployment hazard rates are computed by substituting
the characteristics of the average worker in each week into the
hazard function, and solving for the dependent variable.
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This 1.2 percentage point decrease in the reemployment
probability needs to be viewed in context.

The average weekly

hazard that is, the average probability of returning to work in
any given week was 0.035 or 3.5 percent for the average worker
who was ineligible to receive FSC. 10

The availability of FSC

lowered this probability to 0.023 (= 0.035 - 0.012), or 2.3
percent.

This is a decrease in the probability of finding
i
reemployment of about 33 percent, and suggests that FSC

availability sharply reduced incentives to find reemployment.
An important limitation of, the model specified as equation
(3) is that it restricts the effect of FSC availability to be
constant over the jobless spell.

If FSC had an impact on the

reemployment hazard rate that varied over the jobless spell, then
this constant-proportion restriction would be undesirable.
It is straightforward to relax the constant-proportion
restriction.

Rather than enter eligibility for FSC as a single

time-invariant dummy variable, FSC-eligibility can be interacted
with the time-since-initial-claim variables to yield additional
terms (t^SC, t 2 FSC, ..., t-j-FSC) .

These new interaction terms

are then added to the model:

10.
This so-called baseline hazard is computed by substituting
the sample means into the estimated hazard function and solving
for the dependent variable.
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(5)

Rt = h<t) = b Q + b 1 x 1 + ... + b K * K +
c l*l +

2 t 2 + ''' + C N*N +

d 1 (t 1 FSC) -I- d z (t 2 FSC) + ... + d N _ 1 (t N _ 1 FSC) + u. 11
The d,\f coefficients will represent the change in the reemployment
hazard in period t that is induced by the availability if FSC.
Table 6 and Figure 2 display the central results of
estimating a model based on equation (5).

Column (2) of Table 6,

headed "FSC-Induced Change in Hazard," displays the coefficients
of the interaction terms (d- f d«,

.../ d., . ), which again can be

interpreted as the time-dependent change in reemployment hazard
induced by FSC-eligibility.

<The estimated coefficients come from

a model identical to that displayed in column <2) of Table 5, with
the addition of terms that interact FSC-eligibility with timesince-initial-claim. )

The results suggest that FSC reduces the

probability of reemployment late in the regular benefit spell
(that is, in weeks 22, 23, and 26), and dramatically reduces the
reemployment probability at the regular UI exhaustion point (week
27), and in the weeks during which FSC is received (weeks 28
through 35).
Figure 2 shows the reemployment hazard plots (that is, the
conditional probabilities of reemployraent over the spell of
joblessness) for workers who are eligible for FSC and for those
who are not. 12

The figure throws light on two points.

First,

the pattern the reemployment hazard for FSC-eligible workers

11.
Note that the Nth interaction term Is omitted in order to
avoid perfect multicolinearity.
12. As in Figure, these reemployment hazard rates are computed
for the average worker who remains jobless in each week.
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suggests that restricting the effect of FSC to be constant in all
periods is highly misleading.

Second, and more important, the

figure illustrates the dramatic reduction in the reemployment
hazard among FSC-eligible claimants at the time regular benefits
expire (27 week after the initial claim).

Indeed, the change in

the reemployment probability induced by FSC in week 27 can only be

Claimants who exhausted their regular
I
benefits and were ineligible for an additional 12 weeks of FSC had

described as astonishing:

a probability of finding reemployment of 0.81; whereas claimants
who exhausted their regular benefits but were eligible for FSC had
a probability of reemployment of 0.13.
What are the implications for jobless duration of the
findings displayed in Table 6 and Figure 2?

It is a

straightforward exercise to compute expected jobless duration from
a complete hazard function (Ham and Rea 1987).
reemployment hazard in week t as h(t).

Denote the

This is the probability of

finding reemployment in week t, conditional on having experienced
t-1 weeks of joblessness.

It follows that the unconditional

probability of experiencing t weeks of joblessness is:
p(t) = Cl-h(0)3Cl-h(l)3Cl-h(2)3 ... [l-h<t-l)3[h(t)3.
That is, p(t) is the probability of not finding a job in the first
t-1 weeks (the product of the conditional probabilities of not
finding a job in each of the first t-1 weeks) times the
conditional probability of finding a job in week t [h<t)3expected jobless duration is then found as:

The
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I t[p<t)3.
t=l
Carrying out t-his exercize suggests that the expected jobless

E<D) =

duration of the sample mean worker would have been 40.3 weeks if
he had been eligible for FSC, and 29.2 weeks if he had been
The difference, 11.1 weeks, is the implied

ineligible for FSC.

effect of FSC on expected jobless duration.

The result can be

Each week of FSC availability increased the
i
expected duration of joblessness by over 0.9 week.

stated another way:

This result suggests that the effects of an additional
potential week of UI benefits are significantly larger than most
previous estimates have indicated.

It is unclear whether the

magnitude of the result obtained here should be attributed to one
of more factors that are particular to these data for example, to
the fact that in these data FSC eligibility is uncorrelated with
work history, or to the arguably improved specification of
censoring that these data allow, or perhaps to peculiarities of
the FSC program around the time it expired.

IV.

Summary and Conclusions

This paper has explored the effects of extended unemployment
benefits specifically the Federal Supplemental Compensation
program that existed from 1982 to 1984 on the length of
unemployed workers' jobless spells.

The data used come from the

administrative records of the Illinois Department of Employment
Security, and are especially well suited to such an inquiry for at
least two reasons.

First, because the data span the expiration of
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the FSC program at the end of 1984, they permit one to compare the
jobless spells of workers who were actually eligible to FSC with
the spells of workers who would have been eligible if they had
become unemployed and filed for benefits a matter of weeks
earlier.

This differs from other available data sets, in which

eligibility for extended benefits is not independent of individual
characteristics such as base period earnings or weeks of
employment prior to layoff.

Hence, the Illinois data permit

cleaner comparisions than data used in earlier studies, and we
might expect more striking results.
Second, the Illinois data include earnings history data,
which permit one to correctly classify spells of unemployment/ as
complete or censored.

Earlier researchers have freqently had "bo

make what appear to be erroneous assumptions about whether a spell
of insured unemployment represents a complete or censored spell of
joblessness.
These data yield striking findings about the effects of FSC
on the expected length of a jobless spell.

A Weibull model of the

duration of joblessness suggests that the availability of FSC
increased the expected duration of a worker's jobless spell by
nearly 5 weeks.

The result can be stated another way:

Each week

of extended benefits increased the expected duration of
joblessness by 0.4 weeks <= 4.8/12).

This estimate is toward the

upper end of the range of existing estimates of the effects of
extended benefits on jobless duration.
A hazard model of the conditional probability of becoming
reemployed yields a yet higher estimate of the influence of
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extended benefits on jobless duration.

FSC eligibility

dramatically lowered the probability of returning to employment
around the time of benefit exhaustion and during actual receipt of
FCS (Table 6 and Figure 3).

It follows that FSC increased the

expected length of unemployed workers' jobless spells by over 11
weeks.

Stated another way, an additional week of potential

benefits increased the expected duration of joblessness by nearly
I
one week. The finding suggests that the effects of an additional
potential week of UI benefits are significantly larger than most
previous estimates have indicated.
Perhaps the most striking finding revealed in this work
pertains to the effect that the availability of 12 weeks of
extended benefits has on workers' probability of finding a job at
the expiration of their 26 weeks of regular benefits.

Claimants

who exhausted their regular benefits and were ineligible for an
additional 12 weeks of FSC had a probability of finding
reemployment of 0.81; whereas claimants who exhausted their
regular benefits but were eligible for FSC had a probability of
reemployment of just 0.13.

Hence, the results strongly suggest

that workers tend to find jobs just as their UI benefits expire.
Two conclusions seem appropriate in view of the findings
presented.

First, it seems likely that previous research has had

to make do with data that are rather poorly suited to estimating
the effect of potential benefit duration on jobless duration.

For

example, in most data, variation in the potential duration of UI
benefits is correlated with other factors such as earnings
history.

Also, many studies have been forced to make incorrect
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assumptions about which spells of unemployment- were censored and
which were complete.

Either factor correlation between potential

benefit duration and worker characteristics or misspecified
censoring could lead to estimates of the effects of extended
benefits on expected jobless duration that are downward biased.
Accordingly, the results obtained here suggest that we might begin
to revise upward our estimates of how much an additional week of
benefit availability increases jobless spells.
The second conclusion is somewhat more negative:

In order to

obtain a convincing point estimate of the effects of extended
benefit/s on jobless duration, it may well be necessary to conduct
household surveys that follow-up known spells of insured
unemployment so t/hat completed spells of joblessness beyond the
maximum duration of benefits can be observed.

That is,

administrative data have been pushed about as far as they can in
this endeavor, and additional (very costly) data will be needed to
advance our knowledge any further.
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Table 1
Classification of Workers by Weeks of
UI Benefits Claimed and
Subsequent Labor Force Status

Case

B

D

Number of Observed
Men in Illinois
UI Data (proportion)

Number of Weeks of
UI Benefits Claimed

Labor Force Status
after Benefit Termination

Maximum Potential

In Covered Employment

283

(0.13)

Maximum Potential

Out of Covered Employment

434

(0.20)

Fewer than Potential

In Covered Employment

1040

(0.48)

Fewer than Potential

Out of Covered Employment

405

(0.19)

Notes;
Cases B and C are correctly characterized by usual censoring
conventions; Cases A and D are misspecified by the usual conventions.

Table 2

Mean Insured Unemployment Durations for Men
by Monetary and Temporal Eligibility for
Federal Supplemental Compensation (FSC)
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)

Temporal
Eligibility
for FSC

Monetary Eligibility for FSC
Ineligible
Eligible

Eligible

21.387
(0.402)
(N = 1131)

16.532
(1.144)
(N - 79)

Ineligible

17.864
(0.318)
(N - 866)

20.058
(0.957)
(N - 86)

3.524
(0.513)

-3.527
(1.979)

Difference

Notes: In order to be monetarily eligible for FSC, a claimant needed
have total base period earnings equal to at least 1.5 times earnings
high-earnings quarter of the base period. To be Temporally Eligible
FSC, a claimant needed to file an initial claim for UI benefits befor
September 30, 1984. Insured unemployment duration refers to the tota
number of weeks of benefits (both state regular and FSC) received in
claimant's full benefit year.

Table 3
Alternative Models of Unemployment Duration
(Estimated Coefficients with Standard Errors in Parentheses)

Explanatory
Variable

(1)

(2)

Mean or
Proportion
(Standard
Deviation)

Linear
OLS

(3)

(4)

Weibull Models
Corrected
Censoring
Misspecified Censoring

1.000
(0.000)

11.231
(1.857)

2.712
(0.169)

2.832
(0.166)

20-24

0.196
(0.397)

--

--

--

25-34

0.449
(0.497)

0.958
(0.697)

0.120
(0.064)

0.053
(0.062)

35-44

0.234
(0.423)

2.273
(0.830)

0.237
(0.077)

0.196
(0.075)

45-54

0.122
(0.327)

2.584
(0.957)

0.343
(0.091)

0.299
(0.089)

White

0.640
(0.480)

--

--

--

Black

0.252
(0.434)

4.530
(0.654)

0.477
(0.066)

0.372
(0.063)

Hispanic

0.086
(0.280)

2.382
(0.953)

0.237
(0.092)

0.196
(0.088)

Native
American

0.009
(0.096)

5.060
(2.601)

0.413
(0.268)

0.209
(0.231)

Other
Race

0.012
(0.111)

0.833
(2.238)

0.194
(0.222)

0.418
(0.249)

1.480
(0.754)

-1.114
(0.341)

-0.103
(0.031)

-0.071
(0.030)

Constant

Age:

Ethnicity:

Number of
Employers in
Base Period

Table 3
(continued)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Base Period
Earnings :
< $6,000

0.211
(0.408)

3.622
(1.437)

0.450
(0.130)

0.246
(0.130)

$6,000-$18,000

0.499
(0.500)

4.740
(1.093)

0.515
(0.095)

0.318
(0.097)

$18,000-$30,000

0.222
(0.415)

2.822
(1.096)

0.321
(0.093)

0.200
(0.097)

> $30,000

0.068
(0.253)

--

--

--

Number of
Referrals

0.205
(0.646)

0.224
(0.386)

0.004
(0.036)

-0.023
(0,034)

Dependents '
Allowance
Received

0.465
(0.499)

1.473
(0.529)

0.188
(0.050)

0.129
(0.048)

< $51

0.071
(0.257)

--

--

--

$51 - $120

0.313
(0.464)

1.127
(1.133)

0.110
(0.107)

0.087
(0.102)

> $120

0.616
(0.487)

1.125
(1.361)

0.108
(0.129)

0.077
(0.124)

0.101
(0.301)

-1.231
(0.867)

-0.096
(0.076)

-0.156
(0.074)

Weekly Benefit
Amount :

Labor Market:
Low UE,
High Growth

Table 3
(continued)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.890
(0.968)

-0.120
(0.086)

0.040
(0.089)

0.064
(0.245)

0.584
(1.054)

0.039
(0.097)

0.117
(0.097)

High UE,
Some Growth

0.108
(0.311)

2.251
(0.855)

0.153
(0.082)

0.203
(0.080)

High UE,
Little Growth

0.039
(0.193)

3.453
(1.320)

0.256
(0.124)

0.340
(0.129)

Monetarily and
Temporally
Eligible

0.523
(0.500)

3.293
(0.523)

-0.106
(0.051)

0.180
(0.048)

Monetarily
Ineligible

0.076
(0.266)

0.070
(1.039)

-0.025
(0.105)

0.086
(0.098)

Monetarily
Eligible,
Temporally
Ineligible

0.401
(0.490)

--

--

--

Weibull Shape
Parameter

--

--

0.871
(0.020)

0.813
(0.020)

R-squared (adj)

--

0.078

F

--

9.339

Loglikelihood

--

--

-2,893

-2,683

Low UE,
Stable Growth

0.080
(0.271)

Chicago (Average
UE, Average
Growth)

0.591
(0.492)

Average UE,
High Growth

Eligibility
for FSC:

Table 3
(continued)

Number of
Censored
Observations
Total Sample
Size

(1)

(2)

--

--

--

2,162

(3)

(4)

717

839

2,162

2,162

Notes: The dependent variable in column (2) is the number of weeks of
UI compensated unemployment experienced during the benefit year. Mean
The Weibull models account
of the dependent variable is 19.75 weeks.
for censoring of the dependent variable, imposing the assumption that
the underlying distribution of unemployment spells is well-described by
the Weibull distribution. See the text for a discussion.

Table 4
Transformation of Data on Claimants into
Data on Claimant-Weeks
Panel A:
Claimant
1
2
3

Unemployment
4
38
0
Panel B:

Claimant Records
Reemployed
1
0
1

Weekly
Benefit
$149
$161
$128

Eligible
For FSC
0
1
0

Claimant -Week Records
Reemp loved
0
0
0
0
0
1

Weekly
Benefit
$149
$149
$149
$149
$149
$149

Eligible
For FSC
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
1
2
3

0
0
0
0

$161
$161
$161
$161

1
1
1
1

2
2

37
38

0
0

$161
$161

1
1

3
3

0
1

0
1

$128
$128

0
0

Claimant
1
1
1
1
1
1

Weeks of Since
Initial Claim
0
1
2
3
4
5

2
2
2
2

Notes: The claimant is the unit of observation in the alternative
models of unemployment duration in Table 3 (Panel A). The claimantweek is the unit of observation in the reemployment hazard models in
Table 5 (Panel B).

J/ -
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Table 5
Reemployment Hazard Models
(Estimated Coefficients with Standard Errors in 1

Explanatory
Variable

(1)

(2)

Censoring
Misspecified

Corrected
Censoring

0.0889
(0.0116)

0.3178
(0.0099)

25-34

-0.0041
(0.0023)

-0.0016
(0.0022)

35-44

-0.0079
(0.0027)

-0.0061
(0.0025)

45-54

-0.0115
(0.0031)

-0.0096
(0.0029)

Black

-0.0155
(0.0021)

-0.0134
(0.0020)

Hispanic

-0.0086
(0.0031)

-0.0076
(0.0029)

Native
American

-0.0130
(0.0080)

-0.0091
(0.0075)

Other
Race

-0.0076
(0.0073)

-0.0130
(0.0069)

0.0038
(0.0012)

0.0027
(0.0011)

Constant

Age:
20-24

Ethnicity:
White

Number of
Employers in
Base Period

Table 5
(continued)

(1)

(2)

< $6,000

-0.0183
(0.0048)

-0.0103
(0.0045)

$6,000-$18,000

-0.0203
(0.0038)

-0.0135
(0.0035)

$18,000-$30,000

-0.0138
(0.0038)

-0.0099
(0.0036)

Number of
Referrals

-0.0003
(0.0012)

0.0003
(0.0012)

Dependents '
Allowance
Received

-0.0066
(0.0017)

-0.0055
(0.0016)

$51 - $120

-0.0039
(0.0038)

-0.0030
(0.0036)

> $120

-0.0039
(0.0045)

-0.0024
(0.0042)

0.0043
(0.0030)

0.0070
(0.0028)

Base Period
Earnings:

> $30,000

Weekly Benefit
Amount:
< $51

Labor Market:
Low UE,
High Growth

Table 5
(continued)

(1)

(2)

0.0040
(0.0033)

-0.0011
(0.0031)

Average UE,
High Growth

-0.0015
(0.0035)

-0.0043
(0.0033)

High UE,
Some Growth

-0.0058
(0.0028)

-0.0070
(0.0026)

High UE,
Little Growth

-0.0096
(0.0041)

-0.0114
(0.0039)

Monetarily and
Temporally
Eligible

-0.0011
(0.0018)

-0.0121
(0.0017)

Monetarily
Ineligible

0.0014
(0.0035)

-0.0027
(0.0033)

Included-see Fig. 1

Included-see Fig. 1

30.599

83.491

Low UE,
Stable Growth
Chicago (Average
UE, Average
Growth)

Eligibility
for FSC:

Monetarily
Eligible,
Temporally
Ineligible
Time Since
Initial Claim
Variables

Table 5
(continued)

Number of
Censored Spells
Total Number
of Spells

(1)

(2)

717

839

2,162

2,162

Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if
reemployment occured in week t, zero otherwise. The unit of
observation is the claimant-week (rather than the individual
claimant), and there are 47,014 claimant-week observations. See
equation 3 in the text, and the accompanying discussion.

TABLE 6

Change in the Reemployment Hazard

Induced by Eligibility for FSC
by Time Since Initial Claim
(1)
Time Since Initial
Claim (Weeks)
0
1
2-3
4-5
6-7
8-9
10
11
12-13
14-15
16-17
18-19
20-21
22-23
24-25
26
27
28-29
30-31
32-33
34-35

(2)

(3)

FSC-Induced
Change in Hazard
-0.0003
0.0054
0.0036
0.0006
0.0090
-0.0021
0.0064
0.0026
0.0001
-0.0072
-0.0061
-0.0084
-0.0099
-0.0126*
-0.0034
-0.0317**
-0.6831**
-0.3522**
-0.1064*
-0.2412**
-0.4973**

S tandard
Error
0.0067
0.0067
0.0049
0.0051
0.0052
0.0054
0.0077
0.0079
0.0057
0.0058
0.0060
0.0062
0.0063
0.0065
0.0067
0.0098
0.0133
0.0270
0.0555
0.0782
0.1105

Notes:
Figures displayed in column (2) are coefficients from a
hazard model similar to that in column (2) of Table 5, with the
addition of variables interacting FSC eligibility with time since
initial claim.
One asterisk (*) denotes rejection of the hypothesis that
the FSC-induced change in reemployment hazard is zero at the 5percent level of confidence; two asterisks (**) denotes rejection
of the hypothesis that the FSC-induced change in reemployment
hazard is zero at the 1-percent level of confidence.

Figure 1
Reemployment Hazard Rates for Men Under
Misspecified and Corrected Censoring
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Figure 2
Reemployment Hazard Rates for Men who
were Eligible and Ineligible for FSC
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